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This paper uses a rich survey of 6,446 households in Slovakia to estimate price elasticities
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1 Introduction
The extent of substitution between xed-line and mobile telecommunications services has been
debated since the early days of mobile telecommunications. This debate bears substantial rele-
vance for market denition and, consequently, for the regulatory and antitrust proceedings.1
The historical development of copper based xed-line infrastructure has diered substantially,
in terms of availability and quality, between the Western European (WE) and the post-socialist
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries. In the CEE countries, the telecommunications
infrastructure inherited from the socialism era was in a poor condition before the liberalization
of the telecommunications markets in the early 2000s, which was the prerequisite for the EU
accession). We therefore observe greater shares of households relying on mobile voice services
in the CEE countries than in the WE countries.2 For the same reason, the development of
broadband infrastructure follows a dierent path. Alternative infrastructures, including mobile
broadband access, have a higher share in the CEE countries than in the WE countries, which
heavily rely on DSL broadband access.
To date regulators in Europe hesitate to include mobile broadband in relevant broadband
antitrust markets (with the notable exception of the Austrian telecommunications regulator
RTR), which appears to be driven by a focus the technical and functional dierences between
xed and mobile services.3 However, given the importance of mobile broadband in the CEE
countries we propose a more careful consideration of revealed consumer preferences.
This paper contributes to the discussion on market denition for broadband by providing
an econometric analysis of consumer choices of broadband services in Slovakia. We address
the question of market denition and substitution between xed and mobile technologies by
estimating price elasticities based on discrete choice models, which take into account the actual
choices of consumers. More specically, we estimate price elasticities based on data from a
1The rst step in merger proceedings and abuse of dominance cases is market denition; that is to identify
in a systematic way the competitive constraints that the undertakings face. In many regulatory proceedings the
outcome of a market denition may determine whether a rm has signicant market power (SMP) in the relevant
product market and, hence, whether the National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) may impose ex ante regulation.
In the old telecommunications regulatory framework, a rm was presumed to have an SMP if the share was above
25% of the relevant product market. In the new regulatory framework, the threshold is more closely aligned with
the competition law concept of dominance, i.e., market shares above 40-50% would lead to a presumption of SMP.
2Source: \Special Eurobarometer 362, E-communications Household Survey", 2011.
3Mobile and xed broadband may dier according to the characteristics of mobile and xed oers (e.g.
dierences in price, bandwidth, mobility and usage limitations). Some regulators also point to dierences in in
usage patterns (e.g. some NRAs considered that xed broadband consumers use the service more intensively
and demand higher bandwidth than mobile broadband consumers). Source: \BEREC Report on Impact of
Fixed-Mobile Substitution in Market Denition", December 2011
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representative survey of 10,000 households conducted by the Gesellschaft fuer Konsumforschung
(GfK) in Slovakia (after data cleaning we retain 6,446). Our evidence suggests to extending the
market for xed broadband access towards mobile broadband access. This conclusion may also
be relevant for other CEE countries such as Czech Republic and Poland, which feature similar
market structures to Slovakia.
Discrete choice models are increasingly used to estimate price elasticities. In the discrete
choice set-up, households choose between dierent broadband technologies, which in our case
are: DSL, cable modem, bre, WiFi and mobile. We estimate a mixed logit model, which
controls for observable heterogeneity between households through household characteristics such
as household size and income, and in addition allows for unobserved dierences through random
coecients. We nd that a number of household characteristics inuence the technology choices
and price sensitivity, and there is also signicant unobserved heterogeneity. These ndings
enable us to account for exible asymmetric substitution patterns across technologies; that is,
cross-price elasticities may dier across dierent technologies.4
Based on the mixed logit model, we nd that the demand for Internet access in Slovakia
is very price sensitive, with own-price elasticities at the level of individual technologies ranging
from -4.94 for WiFi, to -3.06 for cable modem, -3.02 for DSL, -2.75 for bre and -1.42 for
mobile. These elasticities suggest that none of the xed technologies can be considered as a
separate relevant retail market for reasonable margin assumptions. In particular, a 5-10% DSL
price increase would lead to substantial substitution to other technologies, making such a price
increase unprotable.
We then repeat the same exercise for hypothetical price increases for various groups of xed
broadband technologies. The results show that no combination of xed broadband technologies
can be considered to be a relevant retail market. In particular, this is the case if we include all
xed broadband technologies together. We nd that the price elasticity of demand for all xed
broadband is equal to -1.98; i.e., a price increase in all xed broadband technologies by 1% would
reduce xed broadband demand by 1.98%. This elasticity suggests substantial substitution
towards mobile broadband and, hence, a relevant antitrust market including mobile broadband,
4The report by the Body of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC, 2011) discusses
market denition and asymmetric substitution between xed and mobile telecommunications services mainly due
to the mobility feature of the mobile services.
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for reasonable margin assumptions.5
The elasticities reported above are country-level price elasticities, which measure the eect
of a national price increase on total demand (where consumers can only substitute to locally
available alternatives). They are most relevant when companies can follow national pricing
strategies. We also consider elasticities at the municipality level. These measure the eect of
local price increases. In the paper we report the local elasticities for 50 municipalities for which
there are sucient respondents.6 For the remaining ones, we provide aggregate statistics. The
elasticities at the municipality level conrm the results obtained at the national level. The local
elasticities are also high, so that in nearly all municipalities the relevant retail market for DSL
includes not only all xed broadband technologies, but also the mobile technology. The results
are robust with respect to various sensitivity tests of the model, which we report in the paper.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant literature.
Section 3 presents the industry background. Section 4 introduces the econometric framework.
Section 5 discusses the data used in the estimation. Section 6 presents the estimation results.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 Literature review
Competition between dierent technologies for Internet access has increased signicantly over
the past decade. The degree of subsitutability of dierent technologies is relevant for antitrust
and regulatory cases and has attracted increasing attention. For instance, in 2009, the Austrian
telecommunications regulator RTR reviewed and partially deregulated the broadband access
market. Based on a market denition for residential consumers that included connections through
DSL, mobile broadband and cable modem, RTR concluded that retail broadband access markets
were not susceptible to ex-ante regulation. The main reason for this was the growing presence
of eective competition due to infrastructure-based competitive pressure exercised by mobile
network operators.7
5Substitution in the other direction, from mobile to xed technologies is lower. Thus, from the perspective of
mobile broadband, xed broadband technologies must not be included in the relevant antitrust market.
6There are 79 counties in Slovakia which are divided into 2,930 municipalities. The 50 most populous munic-
ipalities represent about 36% of total population of Slovakia.
7Initially, the European Commission raised serious doubts towards this approach by the RTR. After the
submission of additional evidence by the RTR, the EC withdrew its serious doubts subject to circumstances
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There is a growing body of studies which analyze substitution between dierent Internet
services. Early studies focused on the substitutability of narrowband (dial-up) and broadband
access, which was new at that time. For instance, Crandall et al. (2002) use nested logit discrete
choice models to analyze demand for Internet access of residential consumers in the US. They
nd that demand for DSL and cable modem is elastic at -1.18 and -1.22, respectively, and
conclude that DSL and cable modem can be considered to be in the same market of broadband
Internet access. In a similar study, Rappoport et al. (2003) use survey data of US households
to estimate a nested logit model for choices between dial-up, cable modem and DSL. They nd
own-price elasticities for cable modem and DSL of {0.587 and {1.462, respectively. Moreover,
dial-up is found not to be a substitute for broadband technologies, while cable modem and
DSL are good substitutes for one another. In a study for Portugal, Pereira and Ribeiro (2011)
estimate demand elasticities for broadband Internet access using household survey data and a
discrete choice model. They nd that the demand for DSL and cable modem is very elastic,
with elasticities of -2.84 for DSL, -4.86 for cable modem. Demand for broadband access is found
to be less sensitive to the price of narrowband access than the demand for narrowband access
to the price of broadband access. Ida and Kuroda (2006) estimate a discrete choice model for a
survey data in Japan and conclude that the demand for DSL is inelastic at -0.85 but the demand
for cable and bre Internet access is elastic at -3.15 and -2.50, respectively. Dutz et al. (2009)
estimate a nested logit model using data for 100 Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the U.S. for
the years 2005-2008. They nd that the price elasticity of DSL decreased from -5.71 in 2005 to
-4.04 in 2008, while broadband elasticity decreased from -1.53 to -0.69.
In a recent study, Cardona et al. (2009) use household survey data for Austria to estimate
discrete choice models for Internet access through DSL, cable and mobile broadband via UMTS.
They conclude that the demand for DSL is elastic at -2.55. Moreover, cable modem and mobile
access are found to be close substitutes to DSL and should be included in the relevant antitrust
market of DSL. A decline in the elasticity estimates for DSL in areas in which cable modem and
mobile broadband are not available is taken as evidence that DSL is signicantly constrained
closely related to the Austrian market, whilst stressing that xed and mobile retail broadband services would not
normally belong to the same relevant market. The arguments for considering separate xed and mobile markets
are based on technical and functional dierences between these technologies rather than on empirical evidence of
consumer behavior. See \Case AT/2009/0970: Wholesale broadband access in Austria: Withdrawal of serious
doubts and comments pursuant to Article 7(3) of Directive 2002/21/EC"
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by these technologies. Most recently, Srinuan et al. (2012) use a survey data for Sweden to
estimate price elasticities of demand for DSL, cable, ber and mobile Internet. They also nd
that the demand for DSL is elastic at -2.73, and the other technologies are close substitutes
when they are locally available.8
Estimates of price elasticities of demand which stem from discrete choice models are com-
monly used to draw conclusions on the relevant product market denition based on the SSNIP
test and to predict the likely price eects of mergers. For instance, Ivaldi and Lorincz (2011)
apply a SSNIP test to the industry of computer servers and nd several smaller relevant markets
in the low-end segment of servers. Next, they compare results with an alternative methodology,
the Full Equilibrium Relevant Market (FERM) test. Nevo (2000) estimates a random coecients
model to study the eects of mergers in the US ready-to-eat cereal industry. Ivaldi and Verboven
(2005) analyze the eects of the merger between Volvo and Scania in the EU. Grzybowski and
Pereira (2007) estimate unilateral eects of a merger in the mobile telephony in Portugal. Fi-
nally, the European Commission uses discrete choice models as evidence for unilateral eects in
a merger between producers and sellers of calcium carbonate, Omya and JM Huber (see Durand
and Pesaresi (2007)).
3 Industry background
3.1 Broadband technologies
The deployment of broadband in Slovakia is spread across ve dierent technologies, namely
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL), Fixed Wireless Access (or briey WiFi), cable modem and mobile
broadband and bre (commonly referred to as FTTH). Each of these technologies has achieved a
8Discrete choice models are also popular for analyzing consumer choices and substitution patterns in xed-line
and mobile telecommunications markets. For instance, Ben-Akiva et al. (1987) use data from US households and a
nested logit model to analyze the choices of local telephone tari plans. They estimate price elasticities of demand
for each local service option, number of calls, average duration and revenues with respect to the xed monthly
charges and the usage charges for calling under each option. Lee et al. (2006) use a discrete choice framework
and consumer survey data to estimate the eect of number portability on switching costs in the Korean mobile
telecommunications industry. Grzybowski and Pereira (2011) estimate price elasticities and switching costs using
discrete choice models and consumer survey data for Portugal.
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signicant coverage.9 As of 2009, the Slovak broadband market was characterized by signicant
shares of dierent technologies: DSL (32%), WiFi (15%), bre (16%), cable modem (8%) and
mobile (29%).10 Compared to other European countries, Slovakia has one of the highest shares
of bre coverage.11
A number of historical developments have contributed to a relatively low DSL share and
intense infrastructure competition. When Slovak Telekom (ST) entered the broadband sector
in 2003, the penetration of xed-line telephones accounted for only 24% of the population. In
subsequent years many consumers gave up their xed-line subscriptions and migrated to mobile
telephones. In 2010, xed-line penetration accounted for 18% of the population { one of the
lowest penetration rates in the EU.12 As a result at present, due to network limitations, only 39%
of all households are able to obtain a DSL service (this is referred to as \technical coverage").
Moreover, according to ST about 62% of Slovak households are covered by ST's DSL network
in the sense that they are connected to an active access line which in theory allows for speeds
of up to 4 Mbps (this is referred to as \service coverage").
These network limitations and the decline in xed voice usage due to xed-to-mobile sub-
stitution made the investment in services based on copper infrastructure unattractive for both
ST and the other Internet providers. As a result, the development of alternative technologies
took o. WiFi and mobile broadband technologies achieved a similar coverage as DSL and the
coverage of bre also increased signicantly. Since the end of 2005, the share of DSL in total
broadband connections has been declining. Ocial data from the Slovak Ministry of Transport,
Posts and Telecommunications indicates that, in 2010, DSL accounted for approximately 41%
of all xed Slovak broadband connections.13 In March 2011, about 59% of households declared
9Penetration of dial-up was historically low in Slovakia compared to the other EU countries because of un-
derdeveloped xed-line infrastructure.
10Source: xed technologies - Research Institute of Posts and Telecommunications (VUS); mobile broadband
- T-mobile, Orange Annual Report 2010
11EC DG INFSO - Communications Committee Working Document - Broadband access in the EU: situation
at 1 July 2010. Note: EU 27 plus Norway and Iceland.
12Ministry of Transport, Posts and Telecommunications, Available at:
http://www.telecom.gov.sk/les/statistika vud/infra tel.htm
13These numbers do not include connections using broadband services over mobile handsets and connections
over EDGE / 2.5G networks. If these connections are taken into account, the share of DSL is below 40%. Source:
Ministry of Transport, Communications and Public Works, Number of the Internet subscribers according to tech-
nologies - broadband Internet access, available at: http://www.telecom.gov.sk/les/statistika vud/pristup tel.htm
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to be `mobile-only' with respect to voice telephony, which is third highest level in the EU after
Finland and the Czech Republic.14
Mobile broadband is becoming increasingly popular due to expanding coverage and improv-
ing technical performance. The connection speed oered by mobile broadband is comparable
to the most popular DSL taris. There is also an ongoing deployment of a new high-speed
mobile data network in HSUPA standard, which is currently supporting data transfer speed
rates up to 14.4 Mbps for download and 1.46 Mbps for data upload.15 According to the market
survey, around 55-60% of consumers of mobile broadband in Slovakia use it at home. Hence,
many households use mobile broadband products as a direct substitute for DSL and other xed
broadband technologies.
Major competitors by technology
There are signicant dierences in the number of available technologies in geographic regions,
where urban areas oer the largest selection of technologies and suppliers. There is a wide
range of DSL products provided by ST (under the T-Com brand) and other providers (SWAN,
Slovanet and GTS) oering the same connection speeds at broadly similar prices. The price
dierentials which can be observed are due to dierences in volume allowance (cheaper products
tend to have a data limit) and in connection speed.
The main cable TV operator is UPC. It provides broadband access services in all regions
in Slovakia. As of the end of June 2011, Internet services from UPC were available to 414,000
households in 22 cities, with a consumer base of about 80,000 households.16
The two leading bre network operators in terms of coverage and consumer base are Slovak
Telekom and Orange. In 2011, the bre network of Orange covered over 300,000 households in
17 cities, i.e., approximately 17% of all Slovak households, and the number of customers reached
51,000.17 In comparison, in 2010, Slovak Telekom's bre network covered 315,000 households in
19 cities. There is also a number of regional providers which operate bre networks, including
SWAN, Slovanet, Antik, Imafex and Gaya.
There is a wide range of WiFi products oered in Slovakia. About 600 out of over 800
14Source: \Special Eurobarometer 362, E-communications Household Survey", 2011
15Source: Orange Slovensko Annual Report 2010
16Source: http://www.telecompaper.com/
17Source: http://www.telecompaper.com/
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registered local providers of Internet services are local xed wireless operators.18 The products
are priced at a comparable level to the other broadband products and oer similar speed of
connection. Most WiFi providers are active only locally and many of them started recently to
roll out optical bre networks. As a consequence their consumers are now increasingly migrating
from WiFi to bre.
The leading mobile broadband operator in Slovakia is Orange.19 In 2010, the 3G network
of Orange covered more than 3 million consumers in 135 cities and 386 adjacent municipalities.
ST's mobile subsidiary T-Mobile Slovakia is ranked second.
4 Econometric Model
A discrete choice framework is commonly used to analyze choices of telecommunications services
(see Section 2). It is also a natural framework for analyzing consumer decision regarding the
mean of Internet access. Each household chooses between a set of discrete alternatives depending
on the household characteristics and product attributes. The rst step in discrete choice mod-
elling is to dene an exhaustive and mutually exclusive choice set and the consumer's decision
process, which is commonly represented in the form of a decision tree. Estimates of substitution
patterns between alternatives depend on the denition of the choice set and the decision-making
process.
In addition to the information on technology which is used by households, the discrete choice
methodology requires information on the price of all alternative means of Internet access that
were available at the time when each household chose its Internet connection. Provided that price
dierences signicantly impact households' decisions, a matrix of own and cross price elasticities
between dierent means of Internet access can be estimated for each household. Individual price
elasticities can then be aggregated for the whole population.
We want to specify a realistic household decision-making process that creates exible substi-
tution patterns between Internet technologies. The simplest discrete choice model to estimate
is the multinomial logit, which generates exible aggregate substitution patterns when house-
hold characteristics are among choice determinants. The model has, however, the property
of independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA), which may result in implausible proportional
18Source: VUS, http://www.vus.sk
19Source: Orange Slovensko Annual Report 2010
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substitution patterns across alternatives if there is a lot of unobserved household heterogene-
ity. Based on these considerations, we rst estimate a multinomial logit model with a number
of household characteristics to control for observed consumer heterogeneity. We subsequently
estimate a mixed logit model, which in addition to household characteristics allows for the
unobservable heterogeneity across households.20
4.1 Choice Set
We rst specify each household's set of mutually exclusive and exhaustive choice alternatives.
Since our objective is to estimate substitution patterns between dierent Internet technologies,
we specify the choice set as consisting of all technologies available in a given geographic location.
We take the following considerations into account.
First, there are signicant dierences in the availability of technologies in geographic regions.
We must therefore allow the choice set to vary geographically, which requires information on the
geographic availability of dierent technologies. Section 5 described how we take the availability
of technologies in dierent geographic locations into consideration.
Second, according to the survey, a signicant share of households uses mobile broadband.
The survey provides also information on whether mobile broadband is used at home or out of
home and whether it is household's main or secondary Internet connection. We consider that a
household uses mobile broadband only if it was declared to be used at home and as the main
Internet connection.
Our base model specication assumes that the set of choice alternatives consists of no In-
ternet subscription and up to ve broadband technologies for Internet access, depending on the
geographic availability. The full choice set consists of: (i) DSL; (ii) cable modem; (iii) bre; (iv)
WiFi; (v) mobile; (vi) no Internet.
4.2 Utility of Internet Access
We use a standard linear utility specication for households i = 1; :::; N over the dierent tech-
nologies j = 1; :::; J . Utility depends on technology characteristics and on observable and unob-
20Mixed logit model allows for rich substitution patterns but it does impose functional form assumptions. This
can aect out of sample predictions, for example, when the model is used to predict the eects of mergers. See for
example Crooke et al. (1999) and Froeb et al. (2005) for a discussion on the role of functional forms in predicted
price eects from mergers.
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servable household characteristics. More specically, let the utility of household i for technology
j be given by:
Vij = x
0
j
ei   eipij + ij : (1)
Here, xj is a J  1 vector of technology dummy variables and ei is a J  1 vector of coecients
denoting the household-specic valuations for the dierent technologies (relative to the base no
Internet). Furthermore, pij denotes the price paid by consumer i for technology j, and ei is
a random coecient for the individual-specic valuation of price. Finally, ij is a household-
specic valuation for technology j, i.e., the \logit error term". It is identically and independently
distributed across technologies according to the Type I extreme value distribution.
The vector of coecients ei and the price coecient ei may depend on both observed
household characteristics and unobserved heterogeneity. More specically, we can write:eiei

=




+Di +




i , i  N(0; 1) (2)
where (; ) refers to a (J +1) 1 vector of mean valuations. Di is a d 1 vector of observable
household characteristics and  a (J + 1)  d matrix of parameters capturing the impact of
household characteristics on the valuations for the J technology dummy variables xj and the
price variable pj . i is a randomly drawn vector from the standard normal distribution capturing
unobserved household heterogeneity regarding price, and  = (; ) refers to a (J + 1)  1
vector of standard deviations around the mean valuations. In our empirical analysis, the vector
of observable characteristics Di consists of age, household size, income, a dummy variable for
having a xed line, a dummy variable for the type of housing (apartment versus house), and
some other characteristics.
In the special case where  is a vector of zeros, there is no unobserved household hetero-
geneity and we obtain the conditional logit model as a special case. More generally, we have a
mixed or random coecients logit model, which allows for unobserved in addition to observed
heterogeneity between households.
4.3 Choice Probabilities
A household i chooses a technology j if this maximizes its utility among all available alternatives,
i.e., if Uij = maxk2Ci Uik, where Ci is household i's available choice set. Hence, the probability
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that household i with given random coecients ei and ei chooses technology j is given by:
lij
ei; ei = PrUij = max
k2Ci
Uik

=
exp

x0j ei   eipijP
k2Ci exp

x0k ei   eipik
where the second line follows from the distributional assumptions of the logit error term ijt.
If there is no unobserved household heterogeneity ( = 0), this is the standard multinomial
logit choice probability that enters the likelihood function. With unobserved heterogeneity, it is
necessary to integrate the conditional choice probability lij
ei; ei over the distribution of ei
and ei:
sij =
Z
e
Z
e lij
e; e f(e)f(e)dede; (3)
where we specied the distribution of ei and ei earlier in (2) to consist of an observable part
and an unobservable part that is normally distributed, i  N(0; 1). This is the mixed logit or
random coecients logit choice probability.
4.4 Estimation Strategy
We can express household i 's probability of choosing the alternative that it actually made asQ
j s
yij
ij , where yij = 1 if household i chose alternative j and yij = 0 otherwise. Assuming that
each household's choice is independent of choices of other households, the probability that each
household in the sample chooses the alternative which it was observed to choose can be written
as the log-likelihood function:
L() = yij
NX
i
X
j
log(sij): (4)
where  is the vector of all parameters to be estimated. To approximate the integral entering the
choice probabilities sij given by equation (3), we use simulation method. Following Train (2003),
we take R Halton draws for the vector i from the standard normal distribution to obtain the
average choice probability per household:
bsij = 1
R
RX
r=1
exp

x0j( + 
r
i )  (+ ri )pij + (x0j ; pij)Di

P
k2Ci exp
 
x0k( + 
r
i )  (+ ri )pik + (x0k; pik)Di
 : (5)
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In the special case of no unobserved household heterogeneity ( = 0), this reduces to the
multinomial choice probability:
bsij = exp

x0j   pij + (x0j ; pij)Di

P
k2Ci exp
 
x0k   pik + (x0k; pik)Di
 :
The maximum simulated likelihood estimator is the value of the parameter vector  that max-
imizes the likelihood function L given by equation (4), after substituting formula (5) into sij .
21
4.5 Price Elasticities of Demand
The multinomial and mixed logit models can be used to calculate the price elasticities of demand.
We are interested in:
 the own-price and cross-price elasticities of demand at the level of the individual technolo-
gies;
 the own-price elasticity of total xed broadband demand, i.e., at the level all xed tech-
nologies, DSL, cable modem, bre and WiFi; and
 the price elasticity at the level of total broadband demand (xed+mobile), i.e., DSL, cable
modem, bre, WiFi and mobile.
We calculate these elasticities at two levels of geographic aggregation: the municipality and
the country.
Technology-level elasticities Technology-level elasticity is a percentage change in demand
for a technology in response to a 1% change in the price of this technology (own-price elasticity)
or 1% change in the price of another technology (cross-price elasticity). To calculate the own-
and cross-price elasticities at the level of the individual technologies we proceed as follows.
Let the aggregate market share for technology j be given by sj 
P
i sij=N , where N is the
number of households in the considered geographic region which can be municipality or the
whole country and sij is a probability that household i chooses technology j. The eect of a
21The algorithm for estimating a mixed logit model is explained in detail in Train (2003).
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percentage price increase of technology k on the level of individual household i's probability of
choosing technology j is:
@sij
@pik
pik =
8<:  eisij(1  sij)pij if k=jeisijsikpik otherwise :
This could also be called individual household i's semi-elasticity of demand for j with respect
to the price of k. Summing over all households in the region sj 
P
i sij=N , the aggregate
technology-level semi-elasticity may simply be dened as the sum:
1
N
X
i
@sij
@pik
pik =
8<: 1N
P
i( ei)sij(1  sij)pij if k=j
1
N
P
i eisijsikpik otherwise :
This is the eect of a percentage price increase on the level of aggregate demand for technology
j. The aggregate technology-level elasticity of demand for technology j with respect to the
price of k may be dened as:
"jk =
1
N
 X
i
@sij
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pik
!
1
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=
8<:
P
i( ei)sij(1  sij)pij=Pi sij if k=jP
i eisijsikpik=Pi sij otherwise : (6)
Group-level elasticities Group-level elasticity is a percentage change in demand for a group
of technologies in response to a 1% change in the price of all technologies in this group. To
calculate the price elasticity at the level of a group of technologies j 2  (e.g. DSL, cable
modem, bre and WiFi) we proceed as follows. Let the aggregate market share for technologies
j 2  be given by s 
P
i
P
j2 sij=N , where N is the number of households in the considered
geographic region. The eect of a percentage price increase of technologies belonging to  on
the level of the individual probability of choosing from the group  is:
X
j2
X
k2
@sij
@pik
pik =  eiX
k2
sikpik(1 
X
j2
sij):
Summing over all households in the region s 
P
i
P
j2 sij=N , the aggregate group-level
semi-elasticity may simply be dened as the sum:
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X
i
X
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X
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@sij
@pik
pik

=
1
N
X
i
( ei)X
j2
sikpik(1 
X
j2
sij)

:
This is the eect of a joint percentage price increase of all technologies in group  on the level of
aggregate demand for technologies in group . The aggregate group-level elasticity of demand
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for the group of technologies  with respect to a joint percentage price increase may then be
dened as:
" =
1
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i
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
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=
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
=
X
i
X
j2
sij : (7)
We calculate the group-level elasticity implied by the estimates for the group consisting of
all xed broadband technologies, i.e., DSL, cable modem, bre and WiFi. The same formula can
also be used for other groups. In particular, we calculate the elasticity at the level of the entire
market, i.e., all broadband technologies including mobile.
Municipality-level versus country-level elasticities We calculate the elasticities at two
levels of geographic aggregation. Municipality-level elasticities refer to the eect of a percentage
price increase on total demand within a given municipality. Country-level elasticities refer to the
eect of a percentage price increase on total demand in the entire country. We can thus distin-
guish between the eects of uniform percentage price increases at the municipal and national
levels. As such, we can consider whether the results are robust when companies can follow only
national or local pricing policies. In Section 6 we present municipal-level elasticities for the 50
largest municipalities in terms of the number of respondents out of 2,930, and take an average
for the remaining ones with a smaller number of respondents.
Our approach thus considers the eect of a percentage price increase on aggregate demand
of all households within a region (municipality or country). This approach to the calculation
of price elasticities is in the spirit of competition policy. Our approach diers from some other
studies. For instance, Pereira and Ribeiro (2011) calculate average household-level elasticities
instead of aggregate elasticities.22
22More specically, they rst compute individual household elasticities
"ijk =
@sij
@pik
pik
sij
=
8<:  (1  sij)pij if k=jsikpik otherwise ;
and then simply average this over all households to obtain "jk =
P
i "ijk=N . These average elasticities are
not equivalent to our country-level aggregate elasticities. In practice, they turn out to be much larger. The
average household-level elasticities in Pereiro and Ribeiro (2011) are also not equivalent to our municipality-level
elasticities. But they are closely related because we present the average municipality-level elasticities for the
smaller ones. If there was only one household per municipality, both approaches would be equivalent.
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5 Data
5.1 Data sources
To estimate the choice models we combine three data bases which are discussed below in detail:
 Database of a GfK telephone survey conducted on 10,000 households in Slovakia.
 VUS database providing information on the availability of dierent Internet technologies
at the municipality level in Slovakia in the rst quarter of 2010.
 Database of broadband Internet taris in Slovakia collected from online sources in the
second quarter of 2011 for 47 main Internet providers in Slovakia according to GfK survey
statistics (252 taris).
GfK survey data The GfK telephone survey was conducted in Slovakia in two waves in April
2011 (a pre-sample of 1,000 households) and in July 2011 (main sample of 9,000 households).23
The sample size is much larger than commonly used in empirical studies for market denition,
especially taking into account the fact that the population of Slovakia is relatively small (about
5.4 million).
For each household, the survey contains detailed information on the Internet connection. For
the purpose of our study, the following information is of particular importance: identity of the
main Internet provider; technology of the main Internet connection; average monthly payment
for the main connection; municipality of residence; year in which use of current main connection
started.
The survey includes also a number of household characteristics, which are used as explanatory
variables in the model: size of the household (continuous variable truncated by 5); housing type,
i.e., apartment versus house (dummy variable equal to 1 if apartment and 0 if house); net
monthly income (continuous variable); age of the respondent (continuous variable); gender of
23The GfK survey was conducted through phone calls to mobile numbers because calls to xed networks were
likely to produce a bias: the share of Slovak households with a xed telephone line is low and therefore households
with xed-line connection are not representative of the whole population. In contrast, mobile phone penetration
in Slovakia is well above 100% of population. According to Eurobarometer, in 2010, only about 8% of households
in Slovakia had xed-line access but no mobile access and additional 6% did not use telecommunications services
at all. (Source: "Special Eurobarometer 362, E-communications Household Survey", 2011.)
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the respondent (dummy variable equal to 1 if the respondent is male); use of another Internet
connection before the current one (dummy variable equal to 1 if the household reports to have
had another Internet connection before the current one); having xed-line connection (dummy
variable equal to 1 if the household has a xed-line connection); having Internet bundled with TV
(dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has TV channels bundled with Internet); having
a secondary Internet connection (dummy variable equal to 1 if the household has a second
Internet connection). The household characteristics are interacted with the price variable and
ve dierent technology dummies, using the sixth option `no Internet' as the base, with respect
to which we interpret all technology parameters.
The survey includes 8,000 Internet and 2,000 non-Internet households. This implies an
under-sampling of non-Internet households because according to ocial statistics, the percentage
of Internet households in Slovakia by the end of 2010 was about 50%.24 To correct for the
under-sampling of households without Internet, for each non-Internet household we generate 3
additional observations with the same characteristics, which is a common statistical approach.25
VUS database The VUS database contains information on the availability of dierent Inter-
net technologies at the municipality level in Slovakia in the rst quarter of 2010. For each of the
2,930 municipalities in Slovakia and 7 broadband technologies (DSL, CATV, FTTx, WiMax,
WiFi, FLASH-OFDM26 and G3) there is a binary indicator showing whether a particular tech-
nology is available in a given municipality. We denote technologies WiMax and WiFi as WiFi,
and Flash and G3 as mobile broadband. The database then contains information on the avail-
ability of ve technologies: DSL, cable modem, bre, WiFi and mobile broadband.
Taris database A database of broadband Internet taris was assembled in the second quar-
ter of 2011 from the Internet websites of the main Internet providers in Slovakia. Among the
information collected were: (i) identity of the provider, (ii) name of the tari, (iii) maximum
24Source: \Special Eurobarometer 335, E-communications Household Survey", 2010.
25The non-Internet households were undersampled by purpose because there was a primarily interest in house-
holds with dierent Internet connections and the survey was costly.
26FLASH denotes Fast Low Latency Access with Seamless Hando and OFDM denotes Orthogonal Frequency
Division Multiplex. In Slovakia, FLASH-OFDM technology is used by T-mobile for providing mobile broadband
using 450MHz spectrum. It provides connections with a maximum eective download speed of 5.3 Mbit/s, and a
maximum upload speed of 1.8 Mbit/s.
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download speed, (iv) data download limit, (v) installation charge, (vi) payment for equipment,
(vii) commitment period, (viii) whether the tari was part of a bundle with xed-line or TV,
and (ix) monthly list price and promotional discounts.
This database contains 1,015 dierent taris for 47 Internet providers with the greatest
number of subscribers according to GfK survey data. The data was processed and narrowed
down to 252 taris for 45 providers based on a specied tari selection algorithm and our best
judgement. The reason for limiting the number of taris was to use pricing information which
is comparable across providers and can thus be applied in the econometric analysis.27
We compute the average monthly price of using Internet services for the 24-month commit-
ment period, to which we refer as price. We dene this average monthly price as: [(monthly
list price)(24 X) + (promotional price)X + (installation price)   (Internet discount) ]/24,
where: (i) the monthly list price is the advertised monthly price, (ii) the promotional price
is the discounted price charged for the initial X months of the contract, (iii) the installation
price is the one-o cost of starting the Internet connection, (iv) Internet discount is the one-o
discount oered to clients who subscribe online.
5.2 Data handling
We use these data bases to determine the choice sets of broadband technologies which are
available to each individual household. For each choice alternative we also need to determine
27There are many similar taris which dier in price because of dierences in the length of commitment period
and in the price of installation. Usually, the longer is the commitment period or the higher is the price of
installation the lower is the monthly price. We focused on taris with a 24-month commitment period (or closest
to a 24-month commitment period), which according to industry experts are most commonly chosen by consumers.
By choosing taris with the same commitment period, we ensure comparability of prices across providers and
technologies. Moreover, according to industry experts, providers typically tend to oer taris which are targeted
at three dierent groups of consumers with respect to usage intensity: low, medium and high usage proles. We
tried to assign each tari in the database to one of these proles. We neglected taris which appear to be variations
of other base taris. We also neglected taris with high installation fees, unless these were the only taris oered.
Furthermore, we focused on taris without additional terms and conditions such as loyalty schemes, etc., unless
these were the only taris oered. For each provider we picked taris in a broad price range to have a closer
match between taris and respondents' declared fees. At the end, we selected 313 taris using these criteria. In
the process of matching taris with survey database we lose some of them because there are provider/technology
pairs which appear not to be selected by any of the survey respondents. The nal number of taris used in the
estimation is 252.
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price.
Determining the choice sets of individual households Since the main purpose of the
model is to determine substitution patterns between dierent technologies, we model the choice
set of a given household as the set of available technology/price pairs at the location of the
household. The set of technologies available to each household is determined by merging the
survey data with the VUS database on the availability of dierent Internet technologies at the
municipality level. In this way, for each household in the survey we obtain information on the
availability of ve dierent technologies in the municipality where the household is residing. In
addition, households can always decide not to have Internet access at all.
Determining the prices of dierent choices Each of the technologies available to house-
holds residing in a particular municipality must be assigned a unique price, which involves
the steps described below. However, since in Slovakia there are 79 counties divided into 2,930
municipalities, we have only few respondents for less populous municipalities. We therefore
rst determine prices on a county level and then use them for choice sets determined on the
municipality level.
 In the survey, households provide information on the municipality of their residence, and
on the chosen provider and technology. This information can be used to create a list of
all provider/technology pairs by municipality, whenever at least one household from this
municipality declared using a given provider/technology pair.28 This list is then aggregated
to a county level including all provider/technology pairs that are available in at least one
municipality in the county.29
 Next, this information on provider/technology pairs is matched with the taris database
to create a list of all taris available for a given technology in a given county. Thus, for
each household which resides in a given county there is a range of available providers,
28GfK conducted a similar survey to the one used in this analysis in July-September 2010. To increase
the number of observations in our nal sample we compile information on availability of provider/technology
from both the 2011 and the 2010 surveys, which together before data cleaning include 16,000 observations on
provider/technology pairs chosen by households.
29There may be instances, in which we assume that a certain provider/technology pair is available in the whole
county, while in reality it is only available in a single municipality in this county.
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technologies and taris. In some cases, a survey respondent reported use of technology
that was marked as unavailable in a given municipality according to the VUS data. We
expanded the choice set in such cases, assuming that the reported technology was indeed
available to all households residing in this municipality, if at least two households reported
using it. The VUS data is from the second quarter of 2010 and some technologies could
have become available within the last year.
 We determine the price of the selected and non-selected alternatives as follows:
{ We assume that the price of selected alternative is given by the price of tari oered
by the selected provider for the selected technology, which is the closest to what the
household declared as the average monthly price paid. In the matching process we
also take additional criteria into account, such as whether the tari used has limited
download volume or is part of a bundle with a xed-line or TV.30
{ We assume that the price of non-selected alternatives is represented by the average
value of all taris available for a given technology in the county where the household
is residing, weighted by the providers' local market shares. The underlying assump-
tion is that households have limited information about prices of available alternative
technologies and form expectations about monthly prices which can be represented
by the weighted average values of all available taris for a given technology. The
weights are calculated from the survey data by taking the number of households us-
ing a given provider and technology in a county and dividing it by the total number
of households using the respective technology in this county.31
Further assumptions We were only able to collect tari information for the second quarter
of 2011, while many households decided about broadband access before this date and may be
30The majority of households (about 95%) provided information on the average monthly price for using the
Internet. For households for which this information is missing, out-of-sample predictions were made based on a
regression analysis conducted for the rst group, in which the average monthly price was regressed on individual
characteristics and information on usage intensity.
31An alternative approach is to incorporate the information on whether a household uses a bundled tari. For
households which declared using a non-bundled tari, the price of non-selected alternatives can be approximated
by an average of all non-bundled taris for the technology in the county where it is located. We have also
estimated the model presented in this paper under this assumption, which gave broadly similar results.
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locked-in by contracts. We need to assume that these prices are valid for decisions on the
technology choice of all households without regard for the time of subscription. This is also a
common assumption in the relevant literature, including Cordona et al. (2009) and Pereira and
Ribeiro (2011).
We do not model choices of dial-up technology. Due to the historical underdevelopment
of xed-line telephony in Slovakia, there was a relatively small number of dial-up users. The
majority of households which reported using dial-up are clients of ST and according to ST the
majority of these households can be in fact considered as DSL users. Hence, we assume that all
of ST's dial-up households are DSL users and we dropped from the sample households which
declared using dial-up from other providers.32 We justify this assumption on the basis of a small
market share of dial-up relative to other technologies.33
5.3 Final sample statistics
The initial number of 8,000 Internet households in the survey is reduced to 6,446 due to several
data limitations. We lose the following number of households: (i) 435 due to missing information
on the technology used; (ii) 354 households declared the use of other xed cable connection to
access the Internet and are dropped;34 (iii) 57 households declared using mobile phones to access
the Internet and are dropped;35 (iv) 391 households declared using dial-up from another provider
32Alternatively, we could drop all households which declared using dial-up including ST consumers. This
slightly changes the market shares of the technologies and increases the share of outside option, which in turn
slightly increases the price elasticities, and therefore has no impact on our conclusions regarding market denition.
In particular, for the mixed logit model the price elasticity for xed broadband technologies increases from -1.98
to -2.04 and the elasticity for all broadband technologies increases from -1.51 to -1.56.
33In the previous antitrust cases narrowband and broadband were considered to be in separate markets. In the
Commission vs Wanadoo Interactive case in France in 2003, the Commission found that the retail prices charged
by Wanadoo for Internet access through DSL were below cost for a period of time, which restricted market entry
and the development potential of competitors. The Commission stated that the relevant market in this case
was high-speed Internet access (up to 512 kbit/s) for residential consumers because subscribers to low-speed and
high-speed had distinct proles and high-speed Internet access modems could not be used for low-speed access
and vice versa. Also, migration from low-speed to high speed was much more prevalent than in the opposite
direction. See also Hausman et al. (2001) for an econometric study for broadband access in the US.
34We exclude households which access the Internet by using xed non-bre cable connection from the analysis
because there is no pricing information.
35Since Internet use via mobile phones may be a close substitute to mobile broadband, by dropping these
households we reduce the share of mobile Internet users, which is conservative with regard to the market denition.
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than ST and are dropped; (v) 1,121 are lost during the tari matching process; (vi) 16 households
are dropped because their provider was taken over according to industry experts; (vii) 76 are
lost due to missing data on the type of dwelling; (viii) 63 are lost because they have only one
broadband technology choice available according to VUS technology availability data. Hence,
the data loss is mainly due to a lack of information on the usage of broadband technologies or
lack of tari data in the case of households who declared using small providers. In total, due to
dierent reasons we lose 2,513 households, which leaves us with 5,580 Internet households and
1,907 non-Internet households.
We further restrict attention to a sub-sample of households who started their current Internet
connection after 2006, which reduces the number of Internet households to 4,126. The motivation
for this restriction is that the availability of alternative technologies was limited before 2007 and
many households did not have the same choice of technologies which they have now.36 Moreover,
most of the growth of the broadband market in Slovakia took place after 2006.37 About 74%
of Internet households in our sample began using broadband after this date. Hence, entrants
focused on acquisition of new clients rather than on competition for those who already were
broadband users.
Among non-Internet households there may be some which are not interested in using the
Internet at all. These households should not be considered as part of the potential market. The
number of households who are not interested in having Internet connection at all is determined
on the basis of a survey question, in which households were asked about plans to set up an
Internet connection in the next 12 months. Households which answered 'denitely yes' or 'rather
yes' were considered to be 'no Internet' households in the base-model specication. Households
which answered 'rather not' or 'denitely not' were not considered to be part of the market
and were consequently excluded from the sample.38 This step limits the number of non-Internet
households from 1,907 to 580.
Next, we correct for the under-sampling of non-Internet households which gives 580  4 =
The share of households using mobile phones to access Internet is nevertheless below 1%.
36The fact that the availability of alternative technologies has increased over time is visible in the VUS data.
37Source: Eurostat.
38An alternative assumption is that the latter households may still be interested in having an Internet con-
nection at lower prices. With regard to the market denition, our assumption to exclude these households is
conservative because it tends to yield lower elasticities. Intuitively, all else being equal, if there are fewer house-
holds who decide not to use broadband this means that the price elasticity of demand is lower.
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Table 1: Sample
weighted % non-weighted %
cable modem 346 5% 346 7%
DSL 1,600 25% 1,600 34%
bre 1,092 17% 1,092 23%
WiFi 165 3% 165 4%
mobile 923 14% 923 20%
No Internet 2,320 36% 580 12%
Total 6,446 100% 4,706 100%
The under-sampling of Internet households is corrected by generating for each non-Internet household 3 cloned
observations with the same characteristics. After correction the share of non-Internet households in the sample
is 50%, which is equivalent to the share of non-Internet households in the whole population in 2011. But some
of the non-Internet households declared no interest in having Internet and they are not considered to be decision
makers at all, which reduces the share of non-Internet households in the estimation sample to 36%.
2; 320 non-Internet households.39 After this step, the nal sample size used in the estimation is
6,446 (2,320+4,126), as shown in Table 1, broken down by technology.
Table 2 shows the distribution of households in the sample used in the estimation by the
year in which they started using their current Internet connection.
Table 3 shows the frequency of households having a certain number of technology choices
according to VUS data.
6 Empirical results
6.1 Overview
We rst estimate a simple multinomial logit model, which only allows for observed household
heterogeneity. We then extend the analysis to a mixed logit model, which allows for both observed
39In February 2011, about 50% of households in Slovakia reported having Internet access. In the survey we
have 2,000 randomly selected non-Internet and 8,000 randomly selected Internet households. After cloning each
of the non-Internet households three times, we end up with 8,000 non-Internet households, which represent 50%
in our initial sample, as can be observed in the general population.
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Table 2: Households by Internet starting date
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total
cable modem 46 55 92 96 57 346
DSL 329 376 461 299 135 1,600
bre 124 217 327 306 118 1,092
mobile 110 186 303 225 99 923
No Internet 0 0 0 0 2,320 2,320
WiFi 27 45 56 25 12 165
Total 636 879 1,239 951 2,741 6,446
The sample of 6,446 households used in the estimation consists of households which started using current Internet
connection from 2007 onwards.
Table 3: Available technologies
Available technologies Households %
1 370 6%
2 1,002 15%
3 1,663 26%
4 1,269 20%
5 2,142 33%
Total 6,446 100%
The frequency of households having a certain number of technology choices according to VUS data.
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and unobserved heterogeneity with respect to technology valuations. A likelihood-ratio test
indicates that the mixed logit is preferred over the multinomial logit model: the test statistic is
equal to 2 =  2 ln (L0=L1) = 394, while the critical value at 1% condence level for three degree
of freedom (three additional random coecients) is equal to 2(0:01; 1) = 11:34. Therefore,
we focus our discussion on more general mixed logit model, and for completeness report the
estimates of the multinomial logit model in the appendix in Table 8.
We begin by presenting the parameter estimates in subsection 6.2. We then discuss how these
parameters translate into own- and cross-price elasticities of demand. Subsection 6.3 considers
the price elasticities at the country-level, which correspond to a hypothetical percentage price
increase applicable throughout the entire country. Subsection 6.4 considers price elasticities at
the level of the municipality, which correspond to a hypothetical price increases applicable only
in a given municipality. The country-level elasticities are relevant to perform market denition if
rms are constrained to a national pricing policy. The municipality-level elasticities are relevant
to perform market denition if rms can follow local pricing policies. Subsection 6.5 discusses
the ndings of an extensive sensitivity analysis. Finally, subsection 6.6 discusses the implications
for market denition.
6.2 Parameter estimates
The mixed logit model is a generalization of the multinomial logit, allowing for both observed
and unobserved heterogeneity with respect to technology valuations. The included observed
household characteristics that may aect the choice of broadband technology are: age, sex,
household size, income, living in an apartment, xed-line subscription, and previous Internet
connection. All these household characteristics are interacted with technology dummies and
with the price variable.
Unobserved household heterogeneity is accounted for in two ways. First, we include a random
coecient for price, thus allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in price sensitivity, which is
common in the random coecients logit literature, e.g., Nevo (2000). Second, we include random
coecients for two dummy variables: one for mobile broadband and another one for all xed
broadband technologies. Such specication considers that consumers have correlated tastes for
the xed versus mobile technologies, relative to the base (no broadband). Note that the random
coecients on these two dummy variables capture similar eects to the nesting parameters in a
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nested logit model with one nest for the mobile technology, one nest for the xed technologies,
and a nest for the outside option (no broadband). Yet our approach is more general than nested
logit because it also includes a random coecient on the continuous price variable.40
The estimation results are presented in Table 8 in the appendix. Although our main in-
terest is in the price coecient, we rst discuss the eect of observed household characteristics
on the technology valuations (relative to the base \no Internet"). Age has a signicant nega-
tive impact on the adoption of all broadband technologies, relative to the base category of no
Internet adoption. Hence, households with older survey respondents are less likely to adopt
broadband. Households for which the respondent was male tend to be more likely to adopt a
broadband technology than female respondents, though for mobile broadband the gender dier-
ence is insignicant. Household size does not signicantly aect the choice of internet technology.
Households living in an apartment are typically less likely to adopt broadband than households
living in a house, with the exception is broadband access via cable modem, which may be due
to the fact that it is easier to deploy cable network in apartment blocks, especially in new apart-
ments. Households with a xed-line connection appear less likely to have broadband, especially
bre and cable modem. This may be due to bundling of copper xed-line connection with DSL,
which reduces incentives to adopt alternative broadband technologies. Finally, households who
already had another Internet connection previously are also less likely to adopt xed broad-
band, especially DSL and bre. There are therefore relatively more households adopting mobile
broadband and WiFi over time, which can be attributed to increasing quality and availability
of these technologies.
The price coecient is most interesting for us because our objective is to estimate price elas-
ticities and to dene the relevant market. The price coecient is negative and highly signicant,
which indicates that households are price sensitive. The interactions with household characteris-
tics indicate the following. Consistent with other demand studies, the price sensitivity tends to
be lower for high income households. Furthermore, households with a male respondent are more
price sensitive than households with a female respondent. This may be because men are usually
40We also estimate a number of alternative specications for the mixed logit model. In particular, we allow for
random coecients on technology dummies and price in models with and without price interactions. We assess
how excluding some of the explanatory variables inuences the estimated random coecients. In general, we nd
that the random coecients on the technology dummies, except mobile broadband, tend to be insignicant in
models with price interactions. The random coecient on price is always highly signicant.
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more technology interested and may be therefore better informed. Also, households with older
survey respondents have lower price elasticity, which may be because they are less informed.
The price sensitivity is also lower for larger households, which may be because the cost is shared
among more users. The price sensitivity is also lower for households living in an apartment,
with a xed-line connection, and who had another Internet connection before.41
The random coecient for the price variable shows that there is signicant unobserved
heterogeneity in the price sensitivity: the mean valuation of -0.688 and the standard deviation
of 0.031 are both highly signicant. At the same time, the standard deviation is suciently
small, so that individual price coecient is negative for all households.
Finally, the random coecient for the mobile dummy is signicant but the one for the xed
dummy is not. This means that there is signicant unobserved heterogeneity for the valuation
of mobile broadband, relative to the valuation for xed and `no broadband'.
6.3 Price elasticities at the country level
What do these parameter estimates imply for the price elasticities? In this subsection we com-
ment on country-level elasticities, and discuss municipality-level elasticities in the next subsec-
tion.
The country-level elasticities measure the eects of country-level price increase on total
demand of all households in Slovakia. We begin with the own- and cross-price elasticities of the
ve individual technologies (cable, DSL, bre, WiFi and mobile), as shown in the top matrix
of Table 4. The elasticities are computed using formula (6) but accounting for the random
coecients. For each household we draw 200 random numbers from the normal distributions
implied by the estimates of the random coecients.
For all technologies, households are highly price sensitive. The price elasticity for DSL is
-3.02, meaning that a 1% price increase for DSL reduces DSL demand by -3.02%. The other
41There are some dierences in non-price characteristics between technologies. In particular, speed and quality
of connection dier between technologies and geographic regions. The technology dummies which we use in the
estimation may pick up some of these dierences. However, if we were not able to control fully for speed/quality
dierences by means of technology dummies, the eect of price on demand would be understated and price
elasticities would be underestimated. Because of price endogeneity there is a positive correlation between the
price and unobserved speed/quality or unobserved demand shocks (see Nevo (2000)). Our results are therefore
conservative with respect to market denition.
27
Table 4: Technology-level own/cross price elasticities for mixed logit
Country-level
cable modem DSL bre WiFi mobile Obs %
cable modem -3.06 0.13 0.29 0.16 0.08 346 5.4%
DSL 0.66 -3.02 0.66 1.50 0.47 1,600 24.8%
bre 1.07 0.50 -2.75 0.80 0.27 1,092 16.9%
WiFi 0.07 0.12 0.08 -4.94 0.06 165 2.6%
mobile 0.17 0.20 0.16 0.29 -1.42 923 14.3%
No internet 2,320 36.0%
6,446 100.0%
Municipality-level
cable modem DSL bre WiFi mobile Obs %
cable modem -4.01 0.59 0.57 1.36 0.36 346 5.4%
DSL 0.94 -4.18 0.96 3.97 0.86 1,600 24.8%
bre 1.26 1.60 -3.04 2.37 0.61 1,092 16.9%
WiFi 0.14 0.27 0.15 -7.49 0.11 165 2.6%
mobile 0.22 0.26 0.23 0.31 -1.48 923 14.3%
No internet 2,320 36.0%
6,446 100.0%
This table shows own- and cross- price elasticities for dierent technologies, based on the mixed logit estimates
from Table 8 in the appendix. The top panel shows the elasticities at the level of the country. The bottom panel
shows the elasticities at the level of the municipalities, averaged across all municipalities.
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own-price elasticities range from -4.93 for WiFi, to -3.06 for cable modem, -2.75 for bre and
-1.42 for mobile.
It is also interesting to consider the cross-price elasticities, which measure the extent to
which households substitute to other technologies after a price increase. We focus on the DSL
row in Table 4 which shows the percentage increase in demand for other technologies when
the price of DSL increases by 1%, holding everything else constant. This reveals that DSL
consumers are most likely to substitute to WiFi (cross-price elasticity of 1.50). Furthermore,
DSL consumers are more or less equally likely to substitute to bre, cable and mobile. The fact
that the substitution between DSL-mobile is comparable to the substitution between DSL-bre
and DSL-cable may seem surprising at rst because bre and cable are also a xed broadband
technologies. However, it can be explained by the fact that the substitution eects are the
combined result of intrinsically correlated preferences and dierent geographic availabilities. On
the one hand, households may have correlated preferences for mobile versus xed technologies
(as follows from the signicant random coecient on the mobile dummy). But on the other
hand, the geographic availability overlaps much more strongly between DSL and mobile than
between DSL and bre or DSL and cable. This is evident from Table 5, which shows that among
the 5,836 households that have access to DSL according to VUS data, 5,475 also have access to
mobile, compared with only 3,749 that also have access to bre, or only 2,266 that also have
access to cable.42,43
We now discuss the price elasticities for groups of technologies, instead of the individual
technologies. The estimates are shown in Table 6, calculated using formula (7) given in the
previous section. As a reference point, the rst column shows the price elasticity for DSL only
42The estimated cross-price elasticities in the simple multinomial logit model without random coecients are
also consistent with this explanation. In this model we found that the cross-price elasticity of DSL with respect
to mobile is even larger at 1.14, compared with only 0.57 for bre. This result is entirely due to the stronger
geographic overlap between DSL and mobile than between DSL and bre because the multinomial logit does not
account for unobserved correlation of preferences.
43Taking the numbers from the diagonal in Table 5 and dividing them by the sample size of 6,446 gives
technology coverage information for our data: 35% for cable modem, 90% for DSL, 59% for bre, 82% for WiFi
and 92% for mobile. These numbers appear to be higher than statistics reported by OECD for 2008-2009: 24% for
cable modem, 78% for DSL, 20% for bre and 81% for mobile. A greater coverage may lead to overestimated price
elasticities but also according to OECD statistics DSL and mobile are technologies with the highest coverage,
which has impact on substitution between them.
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Table 5: Overlaps in coverage
cable modem DSL bre WiFi mobile
cable modem 2,274 2,266 2,251 2,163 2,274
DSL 2,266 5,836 3,749 4,798 5,475
bre 2,251 3,749 3,801 3,347 3,748
WiFi 2,163 4,798 3,347 5,267 4,954
mobile 2,274 5,475 3,748 4,954 5,971
The diagonal shows the number of households for which given technology was available. O-diagonal numbers
show households for which a pair of technologies was available. The maximum availability is given by the sample
size of 6,446.
(identical to the relevant number in Table 4). The second column shows the price elasticity of
demand for all xed broadband technologies: this is the percentage eect of a joint 1% price
increase of DSL, cable modem, bre and WiFi on the total demand of these technologies. Finally,
the third column shows the price elasticity of demand for all broadband technologies, i.e., also
including mobile broadband.
The price elasticity of demand for xed broadband technologies (second column) is equal to
-1.98, which is lower (in absolute value) than the price elasticity at the level of DSL only (-3.02).
This is because substitution possibilities are more limited for households if all xed technologies
raised their prices jointly. Finally, the price elasticity of all broadband technologies including
mobile (third column) is equal to -1.51.44
6.4 Price elasticities at the municipality level
We also consider elasticities at the municipality level instead of country level. These elasticities
are relevant if rms can follow local pricing policies. Since for many municipalities in the survey
we have only 1 respondent, we cannot analyze all municipalities separately. We will therefore
44We have used 100 random draws from the covariance matrix of the parameter estimates to bootstrap con-
dence intervals for our elasticities. The condence intervals are very narrow and our conclusions with respect to
market denition are valid for the range of values between the mean minus/plus standard error. For example, the
country-level elasticities (rst row in Table 6) have a standard error of 0.050 for DSL, 0.045 for xed broadband,
and 0.037 for total broadband.
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Table 6: Group-level own price elasticities: DSL, xed, and all broadband for mixed logit
DSL xed broadband population
Country-level -3.02 -1.98 -1.51 4,359,989
Municipality-level -4.18 -3.50 -1.93 4,359,989
Municipality-level > 20 respondents -3.90 -2.26 -1.68 2,257,242
Municipality-level  20 respondents -4.19 -3.56 -1.94 2,102,747
This table shows the group-level own price elasticities for mixed logit estimates in Table 8 in the appendix for
various alternative denitions of group: (i) group=DSL, which is simply the technology-level elasticity reported
earlier in Table 4; (ii) group=xed, which is DSL + cable modem + bre +WiFi, (iii) group=all broadband, which
is xed + mobile. Municipality-level elasticities are averages over all municipalities, averages over municipalities
with > 20 respondents, and averages over municipalities with  20 respondents.
summarize our results by clustering the municipalities into two groups: (i) municipalities with
> 20 respondents; and (ii) municipalities with  20 respondents, for which we only compute an
average across municipalities.
The bottom matrix in Table 4 presents mean own-price and cross-price elasticities at the
municipality level for the ve individual technologies. The mean price elasticities range from
-7.49 for WiFi, {4.18 for DSL, -4.01 for cable modem, to -3.04 for bre and -1.48 for mobile.
Note that the mean municipality-level elasticities increase somewhat (in absolute terms) relative
to the country-level elasticities.45
Similarly, the bottom part of Table 6 reports the own-price elasticities at the municipality
level, for groups of technologies: DSL only, all xed broadband, and all broadband. The mean
elasticity across municipalities is -4.18 for DSL only, -3.50 for all xed broadband, and -1.93 for
all broadband (xed + mobile). The mean elasticities for the subset of municipalities with at
least 20 respondents are lower. Table 9 in the appendix provides more detailed information on
the elasticities for the full set of 50 municipalities with at least 20 respondents. These estimates
conrm that the price elasticity of xed broadband is high (in absolute value): in all these
municipalities the demand for xed broadband is elastic, and in 45 out of 50 municipalities the
45We have also calculated average municipality-level elasticities weighted by the population or the number
of survey respondents per municipality, which are generally higher in absolute terms than non-weighted average
elasticities.
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elasticity is even larger than 1.50.
6.5 Sensitivity analysis
To assess the robustness of our conclusions, we performed a sensitivity analysis for a few al-
ternative specications including: (i) multinomial logit specication (shown in Table 8 in the
appendix), (ii) specication assuming homogeneous price coecients (no household interaction
variables with price); (iii) specication including TV bundle dummy variable; (iv) specication
including secondary Internet connection dummy variable; and (v) specication based on all
households (instead of only households that subscribed after 2006). The results (not shown in
the paper) are robust for specications (i)-(iv), with xed broadband elasticities ranging from
-1.87 to -2.09. The lowest number of -1.87 is obtained for specication (iv), which included TV
bundle dummy variable. Finally, specication (v) results in a xed broadband price elasticity of
-1.67. These early adopters may be less price sensitive, or they may have based their adoption
decision on a dierent tari than the current one used in the analysis.46 In any case, as discussed
earlier, it is reasonable to limit the sample to households that adopted broadband after 2006,
because the taris in the data are a better proxy for the taris at the time when the households
made their technology decision.
We also estimated an alternative model in which the share of non-Internet households and
hence the size of market is greater. The number of households which choose to have no Internet
connection at all is determined on the basis of survey question, in which households were asked
about plans to set up an Internet connection in the next 12 months. Those households which
answered `denitely yes' or `rather yes' were considered to be `no Internet' households in our
46Broadband subscribers may be locked-in by contractual restrictions. Unfortunately, we cannot take the dy-
namic aspects of decision-making into account because we have only a single period of data and no information
on the commitment period. However, our sensitivity analysis suggests a direction in which price elasticities may
change if at least contractual restrictions were considered. Limiting sample to households which adopted broad-
band after 2006 is equivalent to assuming that consumers who subscribed before 2006 are locked-in. Therefore,
they cannot make a new subscription decision and are out of the market, which reduces the overall number of
decision makers. This results in a higher share of outside option, lower technology shares and therefore based
on the logit elasticity formulas, should lead to higher own price elasticities. Indeed, estimating a model on the
limited sample yields higher price elasticities than on the sample which is not limited by the subscription date. It
would be interesting in future research to consider the dynamics in more detail, in particular by considering the
role of contractual restrictions such as the number of months a household is under contract.
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base model. In the alternative model, we also include as `no Internet' households those which
answered `rather not', assuming that they may be part of the market if broadband price were
suciently low. Households which answered `denitely not' were dropped from the estimation
as before. In this case sample size increases to 7; 282(3; 156+ 4; 126) when only households who
started their current Internet connection after 2006 are considered and to 8; 736(3; 156+ 5; 580)
when the sample is unrestricted by starting date. The resulting estimates of elasticities increase
substantially. The country-level xed broadband elasticity increases to -2.37 and the country-
level broadband elasticity increases to -1,87 in the rst case. When the sample used in the
estimation is unrestricted by the starting date, the country-level elasticity for xed broadband
decreases to -1.82 and the country-level broadband elasticity decreases to -1.46.
Due to the fact that we collected tari data for 47 main Internet providers and most of the
WiFi providers are very small, the share of WiFi users is under-represented. We could not match
survey data with taris data for small WiFi providers. We assess the sensitivity of results with
respect to the share of WiFi households in the sample by using alternative price for selected
WiFi technology in cases when tari data is missing. Households for which we lack tari data are
assigned a tari oered by a dierent WiFi operator than the one selected, where the coverage of
selected WiFi operators is also extended respectively. The market share of WiFi users increases
to 8% from 3% in our base model specication. The country-level xed broadband elasticity in
this version of the model decreases slightly to -1.92 and the country-level broadband elasticity
remains unchanged at -1.49.
6.6 Implications for market denition
What are the implications from these estimates for the denition of the relevant market for
broadband? Should the relevant market be dened at the level of the individual broadband
access technologies, at the level of all xed broadband, or at the level of all broadband (xed +
mobile)? An answer to these questions is important for regulation and competition policy, not
just in Slovakia but also in other CEE countries.47 We can address these questions in two ways:
47Market denition has been criticized over the past decades, especially in the context of merger analysis
where alternative approaches have been proposed, such as UPP-tests and merger simulation. These approaches
can be useful to predict the likely price increases from mergers more directly (also based on price elasticities and
diversion ratio). For example, even with a broad market denition, it is possible that mergers result in signicant
price increases. Nevertheless, market denition continues to be important in various areas of competition policy,
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by comparing our elasticity estimates to other literature, and by conducting a SSNIP-test using
critical loss analysis.
First, it is instructive to compare our estimated price elasticities with other estimates ob-
tained in the literature. The most relevant studies are Cardona et al. (2009) and Srinuan et al.
(2012), which both estimate discrete choice models comparable to our approach. The rst paper
accounts for unobserved heterogeneity using nested logit model, whereas our mixed logit model
includes random coecients for mobile versus xed technologies and for the price variable. Both
studies are based on relatively recent data when broadband penetration reached high levels. The
main dierence between these studies and our own relates to the country of analysis. They an-
alyze broadband demand in Western European countries (Austria and Sweden), which have
copper networks of higher quality. In contrast, we study a Central and Eastern European coun-
try where investments in the copper network have been limited due to historical reasons, which
made DSL comparatively less important and encouraged investments in alternative platforms
including mobile broadband.
Both studies only report elasticities at the level of the individual technologies. For Austria,
Cardona et al. (2009) nd price elasticity of demand for DSL of -2.55. For Sweden, Srinuan
et al. (2012) obtain elasticity of demand for DSL of -2.72 (in areas where all technologies are
available). Both studies conclude that mobile is a strong substitute for xed broadband. Our
own estimates point to more elastic demand for DSL of -3.02 at the country-level, which is even
larger at the municipality-level. Furthermore, we nd that the price elasticity of demand for all
xed broadband technologies (when they all jointly raise their prices) remains very elastic at
-1.98. Thus, there is a strong indication that mobile broadband forms an important substitute
to xed technologies.
Second, we can use these elasticities as part of a hypothetical monopoly test or SSNIP-test
for dening the relevant market. This test denes a group of products as the relevant market
if a joint price increase of 5-10% raises prots for that group. If it does not, this means that
there is suciently strong substitution, so that the market should be dened more broadly.
Implementing the market denition test requires information about price elasticities to measure
substitution out of the candidate relevant market. But there is also needed information on
percentage prot margins, i.e., price over marginal cost, to measure the value of the sales losses
especially in the context of telecommunications in Europe.
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after the price increase. Critical loss analysis formalizes how to incorporate elasticities and
prot margins in a SSNIP test. More specically, it computes the critical elasticity above which
the market should be dened more broadly than the candidate relevant market (see Harris and
Simons (1989)). Having estimates of the price elasticity, we can equivalently compute the critical
prot margin above which the relevant market should be broader than the candidate relevant
market. This is given by the condition m > 1="   t, where m is the percentage prot margin
over marginal cost (the Lerner index); " is the elasticity at the level of the candidate relevant
market (i.e., DSL + other xed broadband technologies); and t is the percent price increase of
the SSNIP-test, usually t = 10%. For the estimated price elasticity of xed broadband demand
at the country level of -1.98, the relevant market should be broader than xed broadband, if the
percentage prot margin is 40.5% or higher.48
Information on prot margins is dicult to obtain, because it requires information on
marginal costs. Cardona et al. (2009) and the Austrian regulator RTR use condential informa-
tion to obtain an indication of prot margins. They distinguish between various cost categories
(access, backhaul and other), and classify these components in either variable or xed. They
suggest that prot margins over marginal cost are about 60% or higher.49 Information from
other sources also indicates that prot margins are high, but presumably somewhat lower than
suggested by Cardona et al. (2009). For example, WIK (2010) provides cost estimates in the
context of new ber networks. WIK calculates certain cost elements as a share of total expenses.
Considering the share of passive network costs, prot margins over marginal costs may rather
be around 50%. This would also be consistent with the estimated price elasticities of demand in
Table 4, together with multi-product price setting behavior. In sum, these sources suggest that
margins are indeed higher than 40.5%.50 This implies that the relevant market is broader than
48If providers set prices as single-product rms, the margins can be calculated using the simple Lerner index
formula, i.e., as the inverse of the own price elasticities reported in Table 4. This would give a weighted average
margin for xed broadband technologies of 33% (1/3.06=33% for cable; 1/3.02=33% for DSL; 1/2.75=36% for
bre; and 1/4.94=20.2% for WiFi). However, this single-product Lerner index only provides a lower bound, since
the main rms provide multiple technologies: ST oers both DSL and Fibre, Orange oers Fibre and Mobile,
Slovanet oers DSL, Fibre and WiFi. Given the sizeable cross-price elasticities in Table 4, the multi-product
Lerner index would be considerably larger, in the range of 40%-50%.
49See \Abgrenzung des Marktes fur breitbandigen Zugang auf Vorleistungsebene," Rundfunk und Telekom
Regulierungs-GmbH, Dezember 2009.
50While this is not immediately relevant for our purposes, an upper bound on the price-cost margin may be
derived under the assumption that all broadband suppliers would be perfectly colluding by maximizing joint
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xed broadband and should also include mobile broadband.51
7 Conclusions
In this paper we use data from a rich survey of 6,446 households in Slovakia to estimate price
elasticities of demand for Internet access. We estimate a mixed logit model, in which households
choose between dierent broadband technologies: DSL, cable modem, bre, WiFi and mobile.
The model accounts for both observed household determinants and unobserved heterogeneity. We
nd that some household characteristics signicantly inuence price sensitivity and technology
choices. There is also unobserved heterogeneity with respect to households' price sensitivity and
valuation of mobile broadband.
The analysis enables us to estimate exible aggregate substitution patterns and calculate
price elasticities of demand at various levels: DSL only, xed broadband and all broadband
(including mobile). We calculate these elasticities at two geographic aggregation levels: for
individual municipalities and for the country as a whole. Municipality-level elasticities are more
relevant if companies can follow a local pricing policy, whereas country-level elasticities are more
relevant if companies can only follow a national pricing policy.
We nd that the demand for Internet access is highly price sensitive. The country-level
price elasticity of demand for DSL is -3.02, which falls in the middle of the range of elasticities
for the other technologies. Municipality-level price elasticities are on average even higher in
absolute terms. Furthermore, the price elasticity of demand at the level of all xed broadband
technologies (DSL+cable modem+bre+WiFi) is equal to -1.98 at the country-level, and -3.50
on average at the municipality-level. We perform an extensive sensitivity analysis and our results
remain robust with respect to various alternative assumptions.
We use these elasticities to compute the critical prot margin above which the relevant
market should be broader than the candidate relevant market, which is given by the condition
m > 1="  t, where m is the percentage prot margin over marginal cost (the Lerner index); "
prots. Given our estimated elasticity of demand for total broadband of -1.51, this would imply the maximum
prot margin is 1/1.51=0.66. In practice, it is therefore likely that the prot margin is considerably lower.
51In principle, the conclusion of a broad market may be subject to a Cellophane Fallacy, i.e., products may
be elastic at the going prices, but not at competitive prices. This issue does not however appear to be a relevant
concern here. First, there are large xed investment costs that need to be recovered from the price-cost margins.
Second, there are many active rms, and there is no evidence that these rms are colluding.
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is the elasticity at the level of the candidate relevant market (i.e., DSL + other xed broadband
technologies); and t is the percent price increase of the SSNIP-test, usually t = 10%. For the
estimated price elasticity of xed broadband demand at the country level of -1.98, the relevant
market should be broader than xed broadband if the percentage prot margin is 40.5% or
higher, which appears reasonable in this market. The evidence from other studies suggests that
margins in broadband market are substantially higher than 40.5%, which implies that mobile
broadband should be included in the relevant antitrust market of xed broadband.
Our ndings have important implications for regulation and competition policy in countries
with a similar structure of broadband market to Slovakia, and especially for the other CEE
countries. As discussed before, the CEE countries inherited from the socialism era poor xed-line
infrastructure. When entering the EU, the lack of a reliable copper network promoted investment
in alternative platforms for broadband access. As a result, there is a strong market share of mobile
broadband technologies in these countries. It seems therefore unwise to automatically presume
that broadband markets in the CEE countries should be delineated in the same way as in their
Western counterparts where xed-line networks have historically been much stronger.
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Appendix 1
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Table 7: Sample statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N
cable modem Age 39.34 12.57 18 74 346
Male dummy 0.51 0.50 0 1 346
Household size 2.85 1.12 1 5 346
Income 1.35 1.11 0.3 5 346
Apartment dummy 0.91 0.29 0 1 346
Having xed-line dummy 0.39 0.49 0 1 346
Had Internet before 0.42 0.49 0 1 346
DSL Age 39.62 12.72 18 78 1,600
Male dummy 0.51 0.50 0 1 1,600
Household size 3.61 1.16 1 5 1,600
Income 1.12 0.86 0.3 5 1,600
Apartment dummy 0.36 0.48 0 1 1,600
Having xed-line dummy 0.53 0.50 0 1 1,600
Had Internet before 0.23 0.42 0 1 1,600
bre Age 39.48 12.44 18 78 1,092
Male dummy 0.53 0.50 0 1 1,092
Household size 3.28 1.18 1 5 1,092
Income 1.22 0.98 0.3 5 1,092
Apartment dummy 0.78 0.41 0 1 1,092
Having xed-line dummy 0.34 0.47 0 1 1,092
Had Internet before 0.36 0.48 0 1 1,092
WiFi Age 36.93 10.74 18 69 165
Male dummy 0.55 0.50 0 1 165
Household size 3.82 1.09 1 5 165
Income 1.22 1.02 0.3 5 165
Apartment dummy 0.31 0.46 0 1 165
Having xed-line dummy 0.33 0.47 0 1 165
Had Internet before 0.30 0.46 0 1 165
mobile Age 38.63 12.37 18 73 923
Male dummy 0.46 0.50 0 1 923
Household size 3.41 1.22 1 5 923
Income 1.12 0.88 0.3 5 923
Apartment dummy 0.43 0.50 0 1 923
Having xed-line dummy 0.29 0.46 0 1 923
Had Internet before 0.25 0.44 0 1 923
No internet Age 40.71 13.64 18 79 2,320
Male dummy 0.49 0.50 0 1 2,320
Household size 3.08 1.28 1 5 2,320
Income 0.79 0.53 0.3 5 2,320
Apartment dummy 0.48 0.50 0 1 2,320
Having xed-line dummy 0.28 0.45 0 1 2,320
Had Internet before 0.00 0.00 0 0 2,320
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Table 9: Municipality-level own-price elasticities for municipalities with > 20 respondents
mixed
county town DSL xed broadband respondents population
Bratislava Bratislava -4.19 -1.64 -1.24 632 428,791
Kosice Kosice -4.45 -1.67 -1.33 300 233659
Banska Bystrica Banska Bystrica -4.76 -2.07 -1.56 157 80,106
Zilina Zilina -4.59 -2.11 -1.60 141 85,327
Presov Presov -3.16 -1.51 -1.17 123 91,273
Nitra Nitra -3.30 -1.36 -1.08 87 84,070
Trnava Trnava -4.24 -2.15 -1.60 86 67,726
Trencin Trencin -2.89 -1.63 -1.23 79 56,826
Poprad Poprad -3.08 -1.65 -1.26 71 54,621
Prievidza Prievidza -3.17 -1.43 -1.12 62 50,664
Martin Martin -4.36 -0.32 -0.21 60 58,433
Spisska Nova Ves Spisska Nova Ves -3.61 -2.25 -1.78 59 38,148
Zvolen Zvolen -2.58 -1.84 -1.46 57 42,531
Nove Zamky Nove Zamky -5.69 -2.41 -1.81 56 40,456
Humenne Humenne -3.49 -3.06 -2.26 56 34,854
Komarno Komarno -4.37 -3.25 -2.39 49 35,881
Bardejov Bardejov -3.63 -1.77 -1.25 49 33,426
Pezinok Pezinok -4.46 -2.61 -1.94 47 21,839
Roznava Roznava -3.20 -2.97 -2.18 47 18,959
Michalovce Michalovce -3.98 -1.72 -1.32 45 39,539
Levice Levice -3.82 -1.82 -1.42 42 35,492
Piestany Piestany -3.87 -2.32 -1.76 41 29,540
Topolcany Topolcany -4.48 -2.85 -2.18 41 28,566
Lucenec Lucenec -3.44 -2.30 -1.69 39 27,547
Banska Stiavnica Banska Stiavnica -5.62 -2.86 -2.13 39 10,547
Partizanske Partizanske -3.66 -3.85 -2.88 38 24,263
Hlohovec Hlohovec -3.80 -2.36 -1.63 37 22,424
Cadca Cadca -2.78 -2.28 -1.63 36 25,564
Vranov nad Toplou Vranov nad Toplou -4.09 -2.32 -1.67 36 23,107
Povazska Bystrica Povazska Bystrica -2.82 -2.42 -1.85 35 41,809
Ilava Dubnica nad Vahom -4.16 -1.91 -1.52 35 25,075
Brezno Brezno -4.39 -1.89 -1.53 34 22,019
Malacky Malacky -3.48 -2.70 -1.94 34 17,937
Liptovsky Mikulas Liptovsky Mikulas -3.91 -1.95 -1.58 33 32,687
Ruzomberok Ruzomberok -3.16 -2.43 -1.85 33 29,687
Trebisov Trebisov -4.69 -1.65 -1.29 31 23,356
Prievidza Handlova -4.00 -3.14 -2.26 30 17,683
Rimavska Sobota Rimavska Sobota -3.31 -1.78 -1.39 29 24,249
Banovce nad Bebravou Banovce nad Bebravou -3.69 -2.42 -1.69 28 20,453
Snina Snina -3.71 -2.08 -1.63 27 21,164
Ziar nad Hronom Ziar nad Hronom -6.12 -1.88 -1.45 25 19,567
Dunajska Streda Samorin -2.49 -1.29 -1.00 25 12,929
Nove Mesto nad Vahom Nove Mesto nad Vahom -2.41 -1.66 -1.18 24 20,370
Galanta Sered -3.52 -2.44 -1.83 24 16,986
Poprad Svit -3.68 -3.69 -2.44 24 7495
Senec Senec -2.85 -1.51 -1.05 22 16,019
Senica Senica -2.06 -1.09 -0.89 21 20,751
Kysucke Nove Mesto Kysucke Nove Mesto -4.60 -4.60 -3.05 21 16,367
Detva Detva -10.74 -5.73 -3.89 21 14,833
Bytca Bytca -2.49 -2.20 -1.77 21 11,627
This table shows the municipality-level own-price elasticities for municipalities with at least 20 respondents,
based on the multinomial logit and mixed logit estimates of Table 8. The elasticities refers to three groups: (i)
group=DSL, which is simply the technology-level elasticity reported earlier in Tables 8 and 9; (ii) group=xed,
which is DSL + cable modem + bre + WiFi, (iii) group=all broadband, which is xed + mobile.
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